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ABSTRACT
Economists argue that rich information environments and formal enforcement of contracts are necessary
to prevent market failures when information asymmetries exist. We test for the necessity of formal
enforcement to overcome the problems of asymmetric information by estimating the value of information
in an illegal market with a particularly rich information structure: the online market for male sex work.
We assemble a rich dataset from the largest and most comprehensive online male sex worker website
to estimate the effect of information on pricing. We show how clients of male sex workers informally
police the market in a way that makes signaling credible. Using our institutional knowledge, we also
identify the specific signal male sex workers use to communicate quality to clients: face pictures. We
find that there is a substantial return to information, and that it is due entirely to face pictures. Interestingly,
the return is in the range of returns to information estimated for legal markets. We also provide suggestive
evidence that our premium to face pictures is not being driven by a beauty premium. The findings
provide novel evidence on the ability of rich information environments to overcome the problems
of asymmetric information without formal enforcement mechanisms.
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Formal enforcement is often seen as the cornerstone of contract design.  While 
information can overcome the problems of asymmetric information (Akerlof 1970; Spence 
1973), principals are unlikely to engage agents unless the information conveyed is credible and 
verifiable.  While the use of formal institutions such as courts is rare relative to the volume of 
transactions, the standard argument is that the presence of formal institutions gives contracts 
their authority.  In Schelling’s (1960) classic terminology, the power to sue and be sued give 
parties the ability to make credible, enforceable commitments, a prerequisite to most 
transactions.  Without means of redress, the information that principals and agents share would, 
a priori, have little value.                 
Numerous studies have documented how informal networks, long-term relationships, and 
reputations overcome problems of asymmetric information.  Indeed, researchers have developed 
large literatures that look at limited contractibility (Hart 1995; Tirole 1999) and situations where 
formal enforcement is costly (Greif 1993) to consider the additional mechanisms that must be in 
place if existing institutions are lacking or unable to mediate disputes.  However, the literature 
has not developed an empirical answer to whether the value of information without formal 
enforcement approaches its value when formal enforcement is present.  
In this paper we ask two questions:  Are formal enforcement mechanisms necessary for 
the information that principals and agents share to have value? If not, then what is the value of 
information in an environment without formal enforcement?  Ideally, we would like to analyze 
an illegal market to answer these questions.  If the underlying contract is illegal, it is by 
definition unenforceable.  Similarly, the information that principals and agents convey to one 
another may not be credible or verifiable.  Illegal markets also rule out the possibility that market 
function or variation in the information environment is due to the presence of formal 
enforcement.  The problem is most illegal markets have coarse information environments.  It is 
therefore challenging to obtain information on prices, quantities, and consumer and producer 
behavior, making empirical answers to these questions especially difficult.  We overcome these 
problems by analyzing an illegal market with a rich information structure: the online market for 
male sex work.       
We begin with a general description of this seldom-studied market.  We then document 
the ways in which the clients of male sex workers informally police the market: by informing 
other clients of deceptive sex workers and by reviewing sex workers on independent, client-  - 2 - 
owned websites.  The informal policing in the market raises the cost of misrepresentation for 
would-be fraudulent escorts and rewards the truthful self-disclosure of honest escorts, 
encouraging truthful self-disclosure.  We further exploit this institutional knowledge to identify 
the specific information clients treat as signals of escort quality.  Both clients and escorts 
explicitly mention face pictures in discussions of escort credibility and misrepresentation.  Using 
narrative evidence from qualitative studies, news reports, and online forums, we show that 
clients look for face pictures in an escort’s advertisement as a sign that the escort is trustworthy.            
To empirically estimate the value of information in this illegal market, we assemble a 
unique and rich dataset from the largest male escort website in the United States.  We gather 
information on every male escort on the website: his demographics, hourly price, two measures 
of reputation, and detailed information about his advertisement. Unlike other studies of 
information which use scripts to download the information in advertisements, we manually 
inspect each advertisement and every accompanying picture and record both the quantity and 
quality of pictures in each advertisement.   
We find that this illegal market values information in that there is a significant return to 
the information provided in escort advertisements.  Interestingly, the per picture price premium 
we estimate, 1.7%, is similar to the per picture premium estimated by Lewis (2009) for used 
automobiles on eBay.com; one of the few studies to estimate the value of pictures in legal online 
markets.  Consistent with our institutional identification, we find that escorts who post pictures 
of their faces receive a sizable price premium: twice the premium to pictures in general.  Spot 
prices—specific transaction prices recorded by clients—independently confirm our central 
estimates. Our main findings are robust to a number of considerations: they hold when looking at 
escorts with no reputation, when looking at spot prices only, and when controlling for beauty of 
the male escort.    
Our paper makes several contributions.  First, we exploit a case where we are able to 
empirically estimate the return to providing information in an illegal market. It is intuitive to 
think that information will be of some value in any market, but the value of information in illegal 
markets is empirically unknown.  While previous empirical work looks at how information 
technology improves market function (Brown and Goolsbee 2002; Jensen 2007; Lewis 2009; 
Goyal 2008), we provide the first evidence that an illegal online market is quite responsive to 
information, even when it cannot be verified and/or where misrepresentations cannot be   - 3 - 
punished.   Additionally, our paper adds to the relatively sparse empirical work on signaling 
behavior. 
Second, we show how this market functions without formal enforcement, describing how 
clients police the market and identify the specific information consumers take as the signal of 
quality in this market.  Irrespective of the reputational concerns of escorts, we document how 
client policing can increase the costs of doing business for low-quality escorts.  This is in 
contrast to the traditional focus on aggregate measures of information, reputation and consumer 
search patterns in online markets (Bajari and Hortacsu 2004; Bakos 2001).  In particular, we 
show that the market does not respond to all types of information: the premium to information in 
this market is driven entirely by face pictures.   
Third, our work expands the scope of the existing scholarship in the economics of crime 
by considering the male side of the sex work market, sex work that is neither street nor brothel-
based, and pricing behavior in illegal markets more generally (Browne and Minichiello 1996; 
Weitzer 2005).  It is difficult to test theories of pricing behavior in markets for sex work because 
price data and survey responses may be incomplete, inaccurate, or biased.  We overcome these 
selection problems by constructing data from the primary source that escorts and clients 
themselves use: the largest, most comprehensive and geographically diverse website for male 
escort work in the United States.   Our paper also contributes to the large and growing literature 
which exploits the vast potential of online interactions.  While we present the first empirical 
results from an illegal online market, previous research has used online data from eBay and 
yahoo! (Lewis 2009; Brown and Morgan 2006; Jin and Kato 2006; Lee and Malmendier 2008), 
dating websites (Hitsch, Hortacsu, and Ariely, 2009), insurance markets (Brown and Goolsbee 
2002) and peer-to-peer lending (Pope and Sydnor 2008; Duarte, Siegel and Young 2009).  
Our novel look at the market for male sex work provides a case where the richness of the 
information environment overcomes some of the problems of asymmetric information.  The 
illegality of the market and the near-impossibility of guaranteed truthful disclosure imply that the 
market should diverge into a “lemons” market or one where information has dubious value.  
However, we find that clients informally police the market, punish misrepresentation, and reward 
credible disclosure.  This enables male escorts to credibly signal their quality, and prices in the 
market respond accordingly.     
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I.  The Online Market for Male Escort Services 
Male sex workers are a sizable portion of the sex worker labor force. The market for male 
escort services is large, with estimated annual revenues in excess of $1 billion in the US, with 
millions of transactions per year (Steele and Kennedy 2006; Pompeo 2009).  Unlike their female 
counterparts, the majority of male sex workers work independently.  There are few 
intermediaries in the male sex trade in the United States (West 1993; Itiel 1998; Aggleton 1999; 
Kaye 2003; Friedman 2003; Halkitis 2004; Parsons, Koken and Bimbi 2007).  As such, male sex 
workers are independent owner-operators whose fees are not shared with others and who 
compete with one another for clients.  This is in stark contrast to female sex work, where fees for 
services are usually set by and shared with pimps or madams, who act as intermediaries.  Despite 
these interesting market features, this market is seldom studied by economists.
1
Changes in technology have modified or eliminated older forms of male escort work. 
Before the internet, escorts would place ads in local gay-orientated newspapers for clients, who 
would contact them and arrange appointments.  The male sex work market now largely takes 
place online (Steele and Kennedy 2006; Pompeo 2009). Although female sex work has recently 
begun to appear online in internet forums such as Craigslist.com (Murphy and Venkatesh 2006; 
Lambert 2007), male escorts have had access to large and profitable websites devoted to the male 
sex trade for well over ten years (Friedman 2003; Parsons, Koken and Bimbi 2007; Halkitis 
2004). Unlike escort agencies and other online transactions between two parties, such as 
eBay.com, the websites themselves do not derive any profits from the transactions that escorts 
make with clients, they simply allow escorts to post their advertisements and contact 
information.  The websites charge a set fee to escorts for hosting an advertisement and act as a 
clearinghouse where escorts advertise their services and clients choose between escorts.  
Consequently, these sites do not screen clients for escorts or vice versa, make no claims or 
guarantees about the quality of the escorts, and offer no recourse to clients in cases of poor escort 
performance or fraud.   
 
                                                 
1 There are few works in the economics literature on male sex work.  Theoretical approaches which focus on female 
sex workers have been offered by Edlund and Korn (2002) and Giusta, Tommaso and Strom (2009), and some 
theoretical predictions for male sex workers have been tested empirically (Arunachalam and Shah 2008; Logan 
2009; Edlund, Engelberg, and Parsons 2009).   The literature on male sex work in the historical, sociological, and 
public health literatures is many times larger and includes Boyer (1989), Dorias (2005), Ginsberg (1976), Hoffman 
(1972), Kaye (2003), Luckenbill (1986), McNamara (1994), Pettiway (1996), and Salamon (1989).  We avoid the 
use of the term “gay” to describe this market since many participants do not self-identify as gay men.  See Scott 
(2003) for more on the semiotics of male prostitution.   - 5 - 
The ability of male escorts to price directly without intermediaries and the large number 
of escorts create a market setting similar to competitive market assumptions where we expect 
markets to function well.  Since this market is an illegal market, however, there is potential for 
escorts to mislead clients and engage in fraud.  In particular, an escort’s ability to post unreliable 
information should lead to adverse selection in the market.  While escort claims are verifiable ex 
post, there are no formal institutional penalties for ex ante misrepresentation.  Similarly, it is 
unclear how much weight a reputation in an illegal online market carries.  Without formal 
enforcement and with the stakes particularly high (especially for men who are married and/or not 
generally assumed to partake in homosexual behavior), it is unclear if a rich information 
environment alone can prevent adverse selection.  Previous research based on newspaper 
advertisements for male escorts found no differences in pricing due to information (Cameron, 
Collins, and Thew 1999).  The open question is whether the rich information environment 
offered by the internet increases opportunities for escorts to disclose positive information about 
themselves, and whether the pricing of male escort services is related to this information. 
The market for escort services is one of the few instances where illegal behavior is 
openly advertised.  While this is extremely rare for illegal markets, there are reasons why escorts 
publicly announce their prices for services.  First, it minimizes the legal risks of sex work.  In 
most police stings for solicitation, the sex worker and the client must agree to both a price and 
sexual conduct.  The illegal contract must specify, verbally or otherwise, the terms of the 
transaction.  By posting prices and sexual behaviors online, clients and escorts do not discuss 
payment or prices.  In fact, escorts are wary of clients who discuss prices, as this is taken as 
evidence that they could be police officers (Friedman 2003).  As described below, how-to guides 
for clients and escorts advise both to keep contractual discussions to a minimum: 
Understand, though, that they might not be able to fully describe over the phone what 
they do because they don't want to get busted…Most escorts will not discuss specific 
sexual acts for sale. Such is illegal and their services are for time and companionship 
only.  Money is exchanged for time only, the decision to have sex would be a mutual and 
consensual decision two adults make. Upon meeting the escort, you may be asked certain 
questions about any possible affiliation with law enforcement (From Rentboy.com “First 
Time Hiring an Escort?” Accessed April 28, 2008). 
 
Second, escorts compete with one another on these websites.  While clients calling a 
traditional escort agency can be steered to a particular sex worker, clients of male escorts can 
freely choose between hundreds of options.  Qualitative interviews with escorts have revealed   - 6 - 
that escorts post prices as a way to ensure that clients who contact them can afford their 
services.
2
There are numerous sources that describe the generic male escort encounter (Itiel 1998; 
Hart 1998).  Clients contact escorts directly and arrange for appointments either at the home of 
the escort (an “incall”), or at the home/hotel of the client (an “outcall”).  In the most basic form 
of an outcall, a client will search escort advertisements and choose an escort.  If an appointment 
is immediately desired, such as the same day, the client will usually phone the escort.  
Appointments for future dates may be arranged by email, although some escorts prefer to make 
all appointments by phone.  Escorts generally encourage clients to describe the length of the 
desired appointment and to note any circumstances the escort should be aware of (e.g., manner of 
dress required by client, clients who may be disabled, etc.).  Escort and client then discuss the 
time and location of the appointment.  Once the escort arrives at the location, he meets the client 
and the two may have a brief discussion to reaffirm the earlier phone conversation.  Money is 
almost never discussed face-to-face.  Money is usually exchanged after the appointment ends, 
but clients are encouraged to place the money in plain view, such as on a dresser or desk, either 
before the escort arrives or at the beginning of the appointment.  
  Third, by setting their prices publicly, escorts avoid the time spent haggling with 
clients over prices, a staple of street prostitution (West 1993; Gertler, Shah, and Bertozzi 2005).  
Escorts assume that any client contacting them knows their price and will pay the posted rate for 
services, just as any other business owner would expect customers to pay the advertised rate.  
Despite this publicly posted information about illegal activity, police raids of male escorts are 
surprisingly rare.   
Itiel (1998) notes that male escorts and clients have less leeway to informally penalize 
misrepresentation than street sex workers and their clients.  While street sex workers and clients 
can freely disengage from a transaction for whatever reason by simply walking away, the 
clandestine nature of an “incall” or “outcall” make it difficult for either party to escape penalty 
free if there has been misrepresentation.  For example, once the escort has arrived at the hotel 
door or home of a client, it may be difficult to induce him to leave without payment.  Also, once 
the misrepresentation is revealed, the client (and potentially the escort) is already exposed: the 
escort knows the client’s location, some form of contact information, and is open to blackmail 
and harassment depending on his circumstances.  Moreover, clients cannot appeal to an 
                                                 
2 This roundtable interview with escorts was accessed at http://www.rentboy.com on April 28, 2008.   - 7 - 
intermediary’s reputation to minimize their exposure.  The very nature of the male sex market 
alters the usual interpretation of the risks involved in sex work.  While male escorts are seen as a 
“safer bet” than male street sex workers (Sadownick 1996; Itiel 1998; Friedman 2003; Dorias 
2005), the overall structure in the market is one in which the client is at risk of harm.
3
Unlike female sex workers, who are at greater risk of being violated by clients, male sex 
workers are prone to violate their clients.  Clients are at risk in a number of ways, and the harm 
from hiring an unsavory escort can have serious consequences.  First, escorts may simply rob 
clients; a traditional scam is to request payment up front and then feign an excuse to leave, never 
to return. Another common ploy is to steal the client’s wallet in the course of an appointment.   
In online forums, by far the most frequent complaint from clients are escorts who take payment 
but do not deliver services.   
   
Second, escorts may blackmail or expose their client’s sexual behaviors.  As noted 
earlier, clients and escorts usually communicate by way of telephone or email before the 
appointment.  Most escorts refuse calls from clients with “blocked” phone numbers, which 
exposes clients to risk of blackmail because escorts can trace the client’s phone number.  Escorts 
could threaten to “out” a client, inform his family of his sexual practices, threaten to contact his 
employer, or even threaten to contact legal authorities since the client has solicited prostitution.  
The case of Ted Haggard (the former President of the National Association of Evangelicals who 
became embroiled in a sex scandal involving a male escort in 2006) is one where the escort kept 
voicemail messages from the client and later released them to the press.  The additional social 
stigma attached to being exposed as a homosexual can be career-ending.
4
Finally, since escorts are relatively young and virile men, physical violence is not 
uncommon.  While escorts usually have an informant they keep abreast of the location and 
contact information for every appointment in case of an emergency, clients most likely do not let 
others know of their whereabouts, leaving them particularly vulnerable (Itiel 1998; Friedman 
   
                                                 
3 As a linguistic (perhaps semiotic) sign of the risk borne by the client, male escorts are also known as “hustlers,” a 
term also used for drug dealers, hoodlums and thieves (Scott 2003). 
4 Several prominent political careers have been damaged by allegations of involvement with male prostitutes (Steele 
and Kennedy 2006).  Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) was reprimanded by the House of Representatives in 1990 when it 
was revealed that an escort acquaintance of his was operating out of his home.  In 2003, Utah state representative 
Brent Parker (R) resigned when accused of soliciting an undercover police officer and in 2006 Tom Malin lost a 
Democratic primary bid for the Texas state legislature when it was revealed that he had formerly been an escort.  
Occasionally the consequences are tragic—Republican lobbyist Craig Spence committed suicide in 1989 when he 
was accused of taking male sex workers on unauthorized tours of the White House.     - 8 - 
2003).  In online forums, clients themselves mention instances where escorts either attacked 
them or threatened bodily harm.
5
Unlike the markets for other services, where clients may not choose to pursue legal 
redress for small matters, clients of male escorts do not have the option of seeking redress for 
any grievances regardless of their size.  While one may be compensated in-kind for poor service 
at a restaurant, for example, we found no evidence of similar arrangements in the male escort 
market, even for small grievances.  This, in turn, increases the incentive for clients to police the 
market, although we note that there are limits to how effectively an illegal market can be policed.  
In the next section, we show how clients informally police the market to minimize the 
probability that they will hire an unscrupulous escort.   
  Clients describe being punched, kicked, threatened or beaten 
with knives, guns, and other deadly weapons.  Moreover, these crimes are likely to be unreported 
since the client would be forced to reveal how he came to know the escort in question.   
  
II.  Evidence from the Demand Side of the Male Escort Market 
a.  Informal Enforcement in the Male Escort Market   
Why would clients be driven to police the market for male escort services? Theoretically, 
in order for signals or disclosure to be informative, there must be a reasonable basis for the 
receiver to trust the accuracy of the signal (Spence 2002, Lewis 2009).  Most models of 
disclosure assume that disclosure is truthful and that misrepresentation does not exist, in these 
instances disclosure acts as a commitment device (Jovanovic 1982).  The key issue is whether to 
disclose truthful information.  This issue is pertinent for firms that would expose themselves to 
significant liability if they knowingly mislead consumers.  In an illegal market, however, such 
guarantees cannot be made and informal policing may be the only option.  A large part of the 
answer is that clients have little choice if they would like to minimize the probability of meeting 
a deceptive escort.  Since the websites that host advertisements for male escorts derive no 
income from clients and maximize profits by hosting the largest number of advertisements, they 
pay little attention to clients’ complaints about deceptive escorts who advertise on the websites.  
Interestingly, one client framed the situation in the classic used-car reference familiar to most 
economists:  
                                                 
5 One client noted “The time an escort grabbed me by the throat and slammed me up against wall rifling my pockets 
for my wallet. Then punched me a couple of times for not bringing my ATM and credit card.” [Unless otherwise 
noted, all further quotes from forums come from the online forum hosted by http://mc.daddysreviews.com.]       - 9 - 
That site is a advertising site, not an agency. If the used car you buy turns out to be a 
lemon, do you take it up with the paper that ran the classified ad for it? Could you 
imagine what managing that he said/ he said would be like? 
 
Just as the purchaser of a car advertised in the newspaper does not hold the newspaper 
responsible for the car being a lemon, clients of escorts cannot hold the advertiser responsible for 
hosting advertisements of escorts who are less than truthful.
 6
Clients police escorts in two ways: through posts to independent client-owned forums and 
through detailed reviews of escort services on the escort websites, which are linked to the 
respective escort’s specific advertisement.  The primary feature of client-based forums is 
information gathering by potential clients.  Clients ask other clients for leads to good escorts in 
an area that they are unfamiliar with, and clients post unsolicited information about escorts as 
well.
  
7  This information is automatically available to all interested users.
8 These forums can be 
used to highlight a number of dangers regarding escorts.  Escorts can create deceptive 
advertisements on escort websites, use multiple aliases, and even steal from their clients.  The 
forum acts to ensure that these rogue escorts are exposed to clients.
9
Additionally, clients can also write reviews of escort services on escort websites, such as 
our data source.  These reviews allow for free-form opinions of the escort’s services. They 
usually contain a great deal of information about the escort and his behavior during that 
particular appointment—clients give information on how the appointment was made, specific 
information regarding the escort during the appointment, such as escort hygiene, physical 




                                                 
6 The most popular client based site has been in existence since the early 1990s.   
  While the escort websites do give escorts the option of allowing themselves 
to be reviewed by clients (nearly 95% in our data allow it), escorts have no control over the 
reviews and all reviews are posted if the escort allows reviews.  This all-or-nothing nature of 
7 Not all exchanges are negative.  Indeed, many clients give glowing recommendations to escorts.   
8 The following exchange is typical. “CLIENT #1: I've been drooling over an ad in Chicago who had been listed on 
XXX as "XXX". Anybody know more? CLIENT#2 (Response): I can add some information on this guy. I actually 
can't remember the name he used, but I do remember the photos. He quoted me $300 and listed himself as a 
dominate top. He showed up at my hotel on time and when I opened the door I didn't think his face looked the same 
as the face pic on the ad. I don't think the other pics on his current ad are him though. So in a nutshell, buyer 
beware.” 
9 The following is an example of such a warning. “[Link to escort advertisement] I hope this link works and I want 
to let everyone to know to STAY AWAY!!!! He stole $500 from my house and is in partnership with John, Johnny, 
Joe … [he] also goes by Jake, Michael and many other names….” 
10 Some clients also participate in client-based online reviews that are not linked to escorts’ websites. These reviews 
serve the same purpose as the reviews which are linked to escort websites.   - 10 - 
reviews is a key advantage of these reputation measures in that escorts have no control over their 
reviews: all reviews for the escort are retained on the website, not a selected sample posted or 
chosen by the escort.  We describe the features of client reviews on escort advertisement 
websites in more detail in the data description below. 
The vigorous policing by clients allows for the stock of information to be large: clients 
who would never meet exchange information about escorts.  While the cost per client to share 
information is relatively low, the returns to the accumulated knowledge are large. These policing 
measures also allow disclosure to be credible.  They raise the cost of deception for the 
untrustworthy escort, creating a wedge where the honest escort can credibly signal and receive a 
premium for doing so. A deceptive escort would need to create a totally new advertisement with 
new pictures and new contact information to continue to operate in the market once he is 
discovered.  These new identities are not costless.  This means the cost of being a deceptive 
escort is greater than that of being a truthful escort.  This cost differential is a necessary 
condition for signaling to be informative.   
 b. Identifying the Signal  
Due to the inherent dangers in male sex work and the unique situation where male sex 
workers have to provide information to their clients with regard to their honesty and safety, the 
information flow is from escorts to clients.  Clients choose escorts from many available options, 
and clients reveal that they choose escorts based on both physical characteristics and cues as to 
who will not pose a threat to their security and privacy.  High quality escorts will show up on 
time, match their advertised description, provide the agreed upon services at the advertised price, 
be discreet, and generally act in a manner respectful of the client’s privacy and safety.   
What information do clients consider when they hire a male escort?  What type of 
information is more likely to be observed given a particular type? We use the same client-based 
forums that serve as policing to identify the types of information that escorts and clients take as 
important in male escort advertisements.  Clients reveal that they pay particular attention to the 
presence of face pictures (ideally multiple face pictures) in an escort’s advertisement as a signal 
of truthfulness.  Clients explicitly and implicitly note that face pictures are more likely to be 
observed when the escort is high quality. 
I've been tempted [to hire an escort with no face pictures] but have always ended up 
feeling let down by anyone without a face-shot so I've stayed away. 
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As far as pics that are probably not real, same deal, do not hire. No one has just a 
professional modeling pic or two and no other pics. They need to have more than one 
face pic in their ads.  
  
Escorts agree that face pictures transmit information about quality in their advice to 
clients and in their advice to other escorts.  Even in their advertisements, escorts note that face 
pictures are what clients take into account.   
Don't get fooled by escorts using headless picture, they are often fake! Choose the 
certified one! A real man! 
 
Indeed, escorts who do not have face pictures in their advertisements apologize for the lack of 
them. 
Goodlooking all-American…clean-cut type…Sorry no face pic but you won't be 
disappointed!! 
 
All of the qualitative evidence suggests that escorts and clients treat face pictures as particularly 
valuable information and a signal that the escort is unlikely to misrepresent himself.   
There are several reasons why face pictures would be a signal of quality.  Face pictures 
give a key measure of immediate representativeness: upon meeting the escort the client would 
know whether the escort was “as advertised.”  This would allow a client to minimize any 
potential losses since misrepresentation would be obvious.  Escorts who do show their face 
convey that they have less to hide.  They are willing to be publicly identified, making it less 
likely they will violate the client or expose him to blackmail or harassment since they could be 
readily recognized by third parties.  Posting a face picture is similar to posting a bond— it 
decreases the probability that an escort would misrepresent himself, and therefore act as 
advertisements for quality (Laband 1986; Milgrom and Roberts 1986; Pope and Sydnor 2008; 
Duarte, Siegel and Young 2009). We conjecture that showing face pictures acts as a signal of 
quality, but could also be interpreted by clients as commitment device (a special case of 
disclosure).  A deceptive escort, once discovered, cannot costlessly reinvent himself.  Also, 
clients can use face pictures as a search characteristic when looking for male escort services.  
Escorts who do not show their faces may not want to be identified because of their occupation 
and/or because they are not high quality.  Not signaling is one way of ensuring anonymity, which 
makes it easier to deceive clients.   
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III.  Conceptual and Empirical Framework 
a.  A Simple Signaling Model 
To bring the description presented earlier into clearer focus we describe a simple 
signaling model in the spirit of Spence (1973, 2002).  To increase the exposition, we use the 
simple two-type model where escorts are of two quality types and attempt to signal to a potential 
client, but we note below how our model is consistent with a disclosure model.  We construct a 
simple one-shot model, but our central result holds in repeated signaling games since signaling 
and reputation act as substitutes for one another in repeated games (Kaya 2009).
11
To begin, we assume that escorts are either high or low quality escorts, which we note as 
     
H θ and L θ , respectively.  In the population of escorts, some fraction λ are type H, and (1-λ) are 
type L.  The cost (c) of signaling (s) is a function of the type of escort and the signal itself 
( ) θ , s c , which we assume has the traditional properties of a signal: the high quality escort can 
signal more easily than the low quality, and the single crossing property holds, such that 
( ) 0 , > θ s cs ,  ( ) 0 , > θ s css ,  ( ) 0 , < θ θ s c , and  ( ) 0 , < θ θ s cs .
12
0 > s
  Escorts can either signal/disclose 
( ) or not signal/disclose ( 0 = s ). As noted earlier, if one signals and is exposed as a low 
type he must incur the costs of creating an entirely new identity, which is substantial in both time 
and money.  The high probability of being detected increases the cost of signaling for the low 
type, justifying the assumption.     
While policing raises the probability of detection, policing in the market will not lead 
every high quality escort to show his face, nor will it lead every low quality escort to hide his.  
Disclosure is not always truthful in this market, as the client forums attest.  There are several 
reasons why a high quality escort may choose not to show his face in escort advertisements.  
Since sex work is illegal, disclosure could draw unwanted attention to the escort.  If an escort 
plans to escort for only a certain length of time, or if escorting is not his full-time occupation, he 
may not want long-lived, easily-identifiable evidence of his previous occupation to hound him.  
News stories abound of men who had been sex workers, and the discovery of their previous life 
of prostitution had serious consequences (Steele and Kennedy 2006).  Exposure as a male sex 
worker could bring into question one’s sexual orientation, which could bring about further 
                                                 
11 Kaya (2009) shows that the degree of substitutability will depend on the agent’s desire for a smooth payoff 
stream. We test for substitution in section VI.C. 
12 We stress here that the costs of signaling may be both material and/or psychic.  For example, if escorts have 
negative attitudes towards gays or would be subjecting themselves to negative outcomes if the public knew they 
participate in gay sex, it would be more costly (psychically) for them to signal to clients.     - 13 - 
negative consequences.  To capture this fact, we assume that the cost function contains a random 
element ε that is unrelated to type 
(1)         ( ) ε θ ε θ + = , ) , , ( s c s c  where  ( )
2 , 0 ~ σ ε N  
This new term in the cost function still allows all of the conditions to hold as before, but now in 
any perfect Bayesian equilibrium the client would have to take into account that a certain 
fraction ( ) α − 1 of signalers would be low quality, and a certain fraction of non-signalers ( ) β − 1  
would be high quality.  The variance of the random term will cause the client to revise his 
expectations of α and β ( 0
2 < ∂ ∂ σ α  and  0
2 < ∂ ∂ σ β ).  Another way of modeling this feature 
would be to have two dichotomous nodes: one for escort type as either high/low quality 
( { } L H q , ∈ ) and another for disclosure/signaling ( { } N Y s , ∈ ), which can be yes/no.  The key 
point is that in either model disclosure/signaling does not fully reveal type, and the model hinges 
on how well correlated disclosure/signaling and quality are believed to be by the client.   
We assume that escort utility is a function of the earnings they receive from escorting (w) 
less the cost of signaling  ( ) θ | ,s w u = ( ) θ , s c w− .
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( ) ( ) L H w w θ θ >
  In any pure strategy perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium, the client must assign a wage that is equal to the escort’s expected productivity, and 
the wage of the high quality escort is greater than the wage of the low quality escort, 
.  As described earlier, if a client observes the signal (the escort discloses), then 
with probability α he will expect the worker to be of type H.  If no signal is observed (the escort 
does not disclose), the client will expect the worker to be of type H with probability (1−β).  This 
gives the belief structure for the client 
(2)      ( ) ( ) L H s θ α αθ θ µ − + = > 1 0 | ;     ( ) ( ) H L s θ β βθ θ µ − + = = 1 0 | .   
The wages offered by the client are therefore a function of the signal  
(3)    ( ) ( ) ( ) L H w w s w θ α θ α − + → > 1 0 | ;   ( ) ( ) ( ) H L w w s w θ β θ β − + → = 1 0 | .  
This wage offer is consistent with the escort’s strategy when two conditions hold.  First, for the 
high type, the utility of disclosure/signaling must exceed the wage offered when no signal is 
observed.   
(4)   ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H L H L H H w w s c w w s w θ β θ β ε θ θ α θ α θ − + > > − − + → > 1 , , 0 1 , 0 |  
                                                 
13 Since we deal only with men who are escorts, and are not concerned with selection into male escort work, we 
normalize the standard reservation wage to zero.     - 14 - 
If this does not hold, then high types would have no incentive to disclose/signal.  Second, for low 
types, the utility of signaling must be less than the wage offered when not signaling,  
(5)   ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) H L L L H L w w s c w w s w θ β θ β ε θ θ α θ α θ − + < > − − + → > 1 , , 0 1 , 0 |  
or else the low type would always signal.     
In the pooled equilibrium the signal does not lead to wage separation—all escorts would 
be paid the same.  In the separating equilibrium, there is separation between types where the 
signalers receive a higher wage than non-signalers. In this case the signal is informative as it 
leads clients to believe that the escort is more likely to be a high type.  In an illegal market such 
as this one, it is difficult to specify which equilibrium would hold.  Most signaling models 
implicitly assume that some type of formal enforcement or institution guarantees truthful 
disclosure.
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There are several reasons we might expect a pooled equilibrium.  First, the degree of 
uncertainty could be large, which can cause clients to react weakly to signals, if at all.  Second, 
the cost differential for signaling by type may be particularly small in this market.  Although 
clients act to police the market, this may not result in a substantial cost differential such that (5) 
may not bind.  This revises estimates of α downward and reduces the value of signaling in the 
market for the high type.  As we discussed earlier, it is possible that escorts themselves create 
deceptive reputations, making it difficult for any client to be truly informed as to any escort’s 
quality, even with client policing.  Any client without direct experience with a given escort 
would be fundamentally uninformed (or less than fully informed) as to the escort’s true quality 
since deception is a distinct possibility. Since the cost of signaling for the low type may not be 
much higher than that of the high type, it is difficult to argue that other players would properly 
infer that an action is equilibrium dominated or not (Cho and Kreps 1987).  By the same token, it 
is not clear if the least cost separating equilibrium is the one that we would observe if there is 
separation, nor is it clear that reputation would solve the problem since those describing the 
reputation of the escort may have ulterior motives.  For example, positive reviews may be left by 
the escort or his associates, negative reviews by competitors.     
   
                                                 
14 For example, consider the simplest version of the signaling model in Spence (1973), where workers obtain 
otherwise useless education to signal their ability to employers.  If schools could not certify that an agent had 
actually obtained the years of schooling she claimed (for example, by printing fraudulent degrees or transcripts), 
anyone could act as if they had the highest level of education possible.  Such fraud would obviously decrease the 
value of the signal.    - 15 - 
We therefore test for whether information in this market leads to separation.  If there is 
separation, then the market overcomes (at least partially) the problem of asymmetric information 
without formal enforcement.  One might expect, however, that in any market with some form of 
communication that information would be of some value.  We noted earlier that face pictures 
could be interpreted by clients as a commitment device, a type of disclosure, but this would 
imply that the posting of face pictures determines the commitment, and our institutional analysis 
revealed that escorts signal against type in both directions.  Testing for signaling behavior is also 
more robust—it is the weaker condition since signaling is inherently inefficient. While 
theoretically the question is whether or not the signal has value, an additional empirical question 
is how much value the signal has relative to the value of a signal in a market where formal 
enforcement is present— whether legal and illegal markets value information to the same degree.   
b.  Empirical Strategy 
The key empirical question is the value of the signal.  Our task is to test if the average 
price of male sex workers who use face pictures, the signal we identified earlier, is greater than 
the average price of those that do not, holding other observables (x) constant 
(6)        ( ) ( ) 0 , | 0 , | = > > s x w E s x w E  
Following empirical studies of information in markets, we use a hedonic regression of the 
escort’s price on the information he provides in his advertisement.  We take the usual 
interpretation that the coefficients reflect a consumer’s willingness to pay for each characteristic, 
and therefore reflect the characteristic’s value.  While there have been criticisms of this 
interpretation due to restrictive assumptions, Bajari and Benkard (2005) show the interpretation 
holds and that the price function is identified under very general conditions that apply to our 
case.
15  If the market separates based on the signal we identified, then face pictures will have 
value in terms of escort prices.  We therefore regress the escort’s hourly price on the signal in the 
advertisements (Signal), reputation and reviews (R), personal characteristics (Z), and identifiers 
for location/market (X).
16
                                                 
15 Bajari and Benkard show that the interpretation is still valid even if there is imperfect competition or a small 
number of products, and prove that even with unobserved product characteristics the price function is identified. 
   
16 We use the hourly outcall price as the dependent variable.  Results are unchanged when using the incall price (see 
the appendix). Individual characteristics include race, weight, height, age, and sexual behaviors advertised. See the 
data appendix for complete variable definitions. We control for the escort’s location not only because price may 
vary with geography, but specific locations may have more or fewer competitors.  We use state fixed effects in the 
regressions, and cluster the errors at the state level.  Results were similar (but standard errors smaller) when we 
included city-specific effects and/or clustered the standard errors at the city level.   - 16 - 
(7)       ( ) i i i i i i X Z R Signal P ε λ δ φ γ ϕ + + + + + = ln  
In contrast to other studies that analyze the total amount of information in the market, we 
disaggregate the information in order to estimate the value of particular types of information.  
We estimate the value of pictures in general and specific types of pictures, namely face pictures.  
Based on the institutional analysis presented earlier, we hypothesize that face pictures are the key 
type of information that leads to separation in the market for male sex work.  If the market takes 
face pictures as a signal of escort quality, we would expect γ to be positive.  If not, then 
participants do not respond to the signal either because it is not believed or because it is a noisy 
signal of quality. 
 
IV.  Data from the Online Male Escort Market 
To measure the role of information in the market for male sex work, we assemble a 
unique data set of approximately 2,000 men from the largest and most comprehensive website 
for male sex workers in the United States.
17
                                                 
17 See the data appendix for further details of data construction and a comparison of our data source to its two largest 
competitors.     
  Since escorts post their prices publicly, we can 
estimate the role of information directly as opposed to inferring prices (Moffatt and Peters 2004).  
Relative to other data sources, our online source has several advantages.  First, this data allows 
us to collect information on escorts’ attributes, prices and information without regard to the 
selection problems that we would encounter in a survey of escorts.  We include every unique 
advertisement on the website in our data.  Our data contains everything a client sees when 
choosing an escort from this site.  Second, escorts have one account on our website and may list 
themselves in multiple cities that they serve.  With other online outlets for male sex work, escorts 
have unique advertisements in each city, and therefore it is impossible to know the number of 
escorts that work from a particular base with certainty.  Third, the escort characteristics that we 
use are entered by escorts from dropdown menus; this is particularly advantageous for features 
one would like to control for in pricing models, such as body type or hair color, where free-form 
responses may be difficult to evaluate consistently or are missing altogether.  Fourth, the website 
is free for viewing by all: there is no charge or account required to view any advertisements, 
photos, or reviews of escorts.  Lastly, escorts are reviewed on the site in two different ways, and 
both types of reviews are available to all visitors.     - 17 - 
Beyond its geographic coverage, our source also includes a rich information environment 
in which escorts can potentially signal to clients.  Figure I shows a diagram of an escort 
advertisement.  Escorts list their age, height, weight, race, hair color, eye color, body type, and 
body-hair type.  They give clients contact information and also their preferred mode of contact 
(phone or e-mail), their availability to travel, and their prices and availability for incalls and 
outcalls.  In what follows, we take the hourly outcall price as the price of escort services, 
although our results are robust to using the incall price.  Escorts also provide clients with the 
range of services they offer in addition to escort work such as modeling, erotic massage, and 
stripping. Escorts have a simple table where they can let clients know their weekly availability.  
There is also the actual text of the advertisement itself, which allows escorts to write about their 
services and quality.  The largest piece of the advertisement is the escort’s pictures, which are 
uploaded by the escort.  These pictures may be of any feature of the escort that he chooses, and 
may be clothed or nude.
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We collect information on an escort’s attributes as listed in his advertisement, using all of 
the information that is available to clients.  Our data source is unique in that it provides two types 
of reputation measures, survey reviews (similar to feedback on eBay.com) and detailed reviews 
of escorts.  The survey reviews ask the reviewer five questions about the escort (four of which 
are “Yes/No”) and a rating on a four-star scale.
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Since we are interested in both the quantity and quality of pictures, we recorded not only 
the number of pictures, but also the quality of pictures.  In particular, we look at three categories 
of pictures—pictures that show an escort’s face in a distinguishable way (which may or may not 
  The detailed reviews, which we term “text 
reviews,” are the detailed free-form client reviews described earlier.  In addition to providing a 
review of escort services, clients also give the date of their encounter with the escort, the type of 
appointment made (incall, outcall, or an extended appointment such as an evening or weekend), 
and the price paid, which we term the “spot price,” as it reflects the price paid in a specific 
transaction.   As we noted earlier, a key advantage of these reputation measures is that escorts 
have no control over their reviews—all reviews of both types are retained if the escort allows 
reviews, not a selected sample posted or chosen by the escort.  
                                                 
18 While nudity is allowed, escorts may not post pictures that display sex acts and may not display pictures which 
include persons other than the escort. Uploaded pictures are placed in an online holding tank until cleared by the 
website’s management.  Every advertisement must be accompanied by at least one picture.  
19 The questions are: Did he show up? Did he match his description? Did he provide desired services? Would you 
recommend him? How hot was he?      - 18 - 
include nudity), pictures that show a nude body only (either from the front or the back, but with 
no face shown), and pictures that show neither nudity nor an escort’s face (e.g., pictures of 
torsos, biceps, legs, feet, etc.). We treat the third category as our omitted category in the 
empirical specification. Since these determinations must be made on sight, the picture 
information variables were all entered manually.   
Table I shows the summary statistics for the escorts in our data. On average, escorts 
charge more than $200 an hour.  This is consistent with other estimates of escort services, which 
are close to the $200 an hour range (Steele and Kennedy 2006; Pompeo 2009).  Escorts are 
reasonably fit and relatively young; on average they are 28 years old, 5’10” tall and weigh 
around 165 pounds.  Escorts are racially diverse; while more than half of all escorts are white, 
more than a fifth are black and more than a tenth are Hispanic.  In terms of information, escorts 
post an average of six pictures in their advertisements, have three survey reviews, and one-in-
three escorts has a text review.  Two-thirds of escorts post at least one face picture and, on 
average, escorts post three pictures containing their face and two containing their nude body with 
no face shown.  There are some differences when looking at the summary statistics for escorts by 
whether they post face pictures.  For example, the average escort who shows pictures of his face 
posts nearly seven pictures, four of which are of his face.  The average escort who does not show 
pictures of his face posts five pictures, three of which are of his nude body.  Escorts who post 
face pictures charge approximately $230 an hour, while escorts who do not post face picture 
charge approximately $190 an hour.  In the next section, we check to see if these differences in 
prices hold after controlling for various individual, reputation, and geographic differences.     
 
V.  Face Value 
Table II reports OLS regression results from the basic specification, where we regress the 
escort’s log hourly price on the number of pictures and a large number of controls such as escort 
characteristics and location.  We consider this to be our naïve specification since it treats all 
information equally and considers only the quantity of the information.  Column 1 shows that the 
number of pictures in an escort’s advertisement is strongly related to the escort’s price, 
controlling for individual characteristics and market location.  Each additional picture increases 
an escort’s price by 1.7%, and is significant at the 0.01 level.  A one standard deviation in the 
number of pictures increases the escort’s price by 0.16 of a standard deviation, a sizable effect.    - 19 - 
The magnitude of the premium for pictures is close to the premium noted by Lewis (2009) for 
used cars on eBay.com (1.66% and 1.82%), one of the few estimates for the value of information 
in legal markets.  We find that information has value in this illegal market just as it does in legal 
markets where enforcement is formal and thorough.
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In column 2 we add the more coarse measure of reputation—survey reviews—and find 
that the number of survey reviews does not vary significantly with escort prices.  In column 3 we 
add the more detailed and informative measure of reputation: free-form text reviews.  Text 
reviews are strongly and positively related to prices, a one standard deviation in the number of 
text reviews increases escort prices by .3 standard deviations.  Consistent with other results in the 
literature, reputation affects prices in the male escort market.  In fact, text reviews affect the 
price more than the total number of pictures. 
   
In column 4 of Table II we add a dichotomous measure for the presence of face pictures 
in an advertisement.  The institutional evidence we presented earlier suggests that face pictures 
are the key measure of truthfulness in the market, and we therefore expect their presence to be 
positively related to escort prices if they are a signal of quality.  The effect of face pictures on 
prices is large.  Escorts who post pictures of their faces have prices that are more than 20% 
higher than those that do not, even after controlling for both measures of reputation and a host of 
individual escort and market characteristics.
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We can use the results from Table II to bound the cost of signaling for each type.  Recall 
from the model presented earlier that for both high and low types, the utility of signaling must 
exceed the wage offered when no signal is observed (equations 4 and 5).  Rearranging terms in 
equations (4) and (5) and simplifying the expression yields  
  Additionally, including a measure of whether face 
pictures are present significantly reduces the relationship between total pictures and the escort’s 
price—the coefficient on number of pictures is reduced by more than 50% once the indicator for 
face pictures is included.  In column 5 we include a dichotomous measure of having a nude body 
picture with no face shown.  The effect of having nude, headless photos actually reduces the 
price by more than 5%.   
(8)      ( ) ( ) ( ) ε θ , , 0 0 | 0 | H s c s w s w > > = − >    
                                                 
20 Lewis (2009) describes the lengths taken by eBay to eliminate fraud in their used car sales, including prosecution. 
21 Since the specification is semi logarithmic, the percentage change is approximated by exp(γ)-1 (Halvorsen and 
Palmquist 1980).   - 20 - 
(9)      ( ) ( ) ( ) ε θ , , 0 0 | 0 | L s c s w s w > < = − >  
We know the value of the difference between the signal and no signal, ( ) ( ) 0 | 0 | = − > s w s w , is 
a 20% difference in hourly price as shown in Table II.  Taking $200 as the average hourly price 
of escort services in our data, the difference is roughly $40.  This implies that $40 is greater than 
the cost of signaling for the high type and lower than the cost of signaling for the low type in this 
market.  If an escort sees an average of twenty clients per month, the difference would amount to 
roughly $10,000 per year in additional earnings for the signalers. 
While Table II examines the role of information at the extensive margin, we would like to 
know if intensive measures of information are consistent with the extensive margin results.  
Table III presents the results from our preferred specifications, in which we use the number of 
face and body pictures in the specification.  We investigate the premium to each additional face 
picture and body picture to see how much of the total premium to pictures can be attributed to 
each type.       
In Panel A of Table III we use the number of face and body-only pictures as our 
measures of information. Column 1 shows that the premium to each face picture is large—each 
additional face picture increases the price charged by an escort by roughly 3%, nearly twice the 
premium of total pictures reported in Table II.  Put another way, a one standard deviation in the 
number of face pictures increases escort prices by 0.3 of a standard deviation and is significant at 
the 0.01 level.  In column 2 of Panel A we add body-only pictures and find that they are not 
significantly related to prices.  In columns 3 and 4 we add the two measures of reputation and 
find that they behave similarly to the results in Table II, where survey reviews are not related to 
prices and where text reviews are strongly related to escort prices.  In column 5 we control for a 
host of escort and market specific characteristics and the result holds—the premium to face 
pictures is much larger than the premium to pictures overall, and body-only pictures are not 
significantly related to prices.   
In Panel A of Table III we allow picture types to enter directly, but this can be 
problematic since escorts who convey different information may also use different numbers of 
pictures.  In Panel B of Table III we use a specification that controls for the total number of 
pictures in an advertisement to focus on the composition of the information rather than the size.  
In column 1 of Panel B we include the number of pictures and the share of pictures that are face 
pictures.  Consistent with the results in Panel A, the fraction of face pictures is strongly related to   - 21 - 
escort prices. A one standard deviation in the fraction of face pictures increases escort prices by 
0.12 of a standard deviation.  In column 2 we add the fraction of pictures that are body-only 
pictures and find that they are negatively related to prices, but their effect on prices (in absolute 
value) is much smaller than the effect of face pictures.  In columns 3 and 4 we add measures of 
reputation, and in column 5 we add the fraction of each reputation measure that is positive, but 
since these are almost always positive they have little effect on the results.
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Taken together, Tables II and III establish that information and reputation are important 
in the market for male sex work.  While the amount of information matters (each picture 
increases prices by roughly 1.5%), the quality of the information matters more (each face picture 
increases prices by 3%).  In fact, the entire premium to information in the market is driven by 
face pictures.
 
  The inclusion of the 
additional reputation measures does lessen the magnitude of the effect of body-only pictures, and 
in column 5 they cease to be statistically significant.  The effect of face pictures is robust to the 
inclusion of reputational measures.   
23
 
  Also, reputation matters in the market, but only in the form of free-form text 
reviews, which contain more information about an escort’s quality and behavior than survey 
reviews.  The results support the idea that the information environment afforded by the internet 
allows male sex workers to disclose their type and receive a premium for doing so, and also 
supports the hypothesis that face pictures are a specific signal of quality in this market. More 
importantly, our results suggest that the value of information conveyed in an illegal market is 
similar to the value of information provided in a legal market environment. 
VI.  Considering Alternative Explanations 
The previous section presented evidence in support of our interpretation of face pictures 
as a signal of quality.  However, our interpretation is suspect to several criticisms given the 
cross-sectional nature of our data.  First, though we show that price responds positively to the 
presence of face pictures, we also need to establish that the value of face pictures is not infinite, 
as that would be implausible. Below we show just that the marginal value of face pictures 
decreases as a function of face pictures.  Second, it is possible that clients respond to empty 
signals of quality, and we explore this possibility below and find it to be inconsistent with the 
                                                 
22 Specifications that used the fraction of reviews that were negative were negatively related to escort prices, but 
were not statistically significant.   
23 Note that the omitted category in Table III is non-face, non-nude pictures.  This omitted category is not related to 
escort prices. See Appendix Table III for specifications that include all three picture types.     - 22 - 
evidence.  Third, our results could be driven by a beauty premium as opposed to a signal of 
quality.  We provide suggestive evidence that beauty is not the driving force behind the face 
picture premium. Lastly, we construct a counterfactual and show that where client policing is 
stymied the value of the signal decreases substantially, confirming the claim that information 
only has value when the signal is credible.   
a.  Marginal Face Value  
Since our interpretation hinges on face pictures being a signal of quality, it is critical to 
estimate the marginal value of face pictures.  The marginal value of face pictures should be a 
decreasing function of the number of face pictures.  Once a threshold of credibility is attained, 
additional pictures should not convey additional quality.  If not, escorts could be rewarded for 
infinite face pictures.  This would imply that the signal had infinitely positive value, and that 
would certainly be difficult to justify.  In our review of client forums, clients note that they look 
for multiple pictures of an escort’s face, however, there should be a limit to their value.   
To estimate the marginal value of face pictures, we estimate a polynomial function of the 
value of face pictures.
24
b.  True Quality          
  We plot the marginal value as a function of the number of face pictures 
in Figure II.  As the figure shows, the marginal value of face pictures decreases sharply, 
approaching zero at the seventh picture.  We believe that these marginal values are consistent 
with our interpretation of the results.  The average value of face pictures is large, but the 
marginal value of the 8th additional face picture is indistinguishable from zero. While the signal 
has value, excessive signaling is not rewarded in this market.  
It could be that clients are responding to empty signals of quality.  Jin and Kato (2006) 
conducted an experiment on eBay.com auctions for baseball cards and found that while 
advertised quality was positively related to price, actual quality was not.  They conclude that 
sellers in online markets target uninformed buyers, and that eBay.com’s system of universal 
ratings and anonymous identities allows this situation to persist.  Buyers could also be lulled into 
a false sense of security given the fraud protection offered by online auctions.  Lewis (2009) 
contends that Jin and Kato’s result may be due to the fact that the stakes are relatively low in the 
auctions that they study.  It would certainly be true that the stakes for misrepresentation are high 
in the market we study, both in dollar value and the potential negative outcomes from 
                                                 
24 We give the results for a third-degree polynomial specification in the appendix.   - 23 - 
misrepresentation.  Furthermore, while buyers in online markets such as eBay.com have some 
form of formal protection from fraud, the clients of a male escort do not have any formal or 
implied guarantees against fraud: it is not possible for them to be lulled into a false sense of 
security by an escort’s guarantee.  The active policing we documented earlier shows that clients 
are not easily or consistently fooled.  As such, while some portion of these results could be 
explained by uninformed consumers, it is likely to be small.  Also, nearly every escort advertises 
that he is of the best quality.  While signals of quality vary, claims of quality do not.   
c.  Beauty 
One concern with the interpretation of our results is that the face picture premium could 
be due to a beauty premium and not signaling. Many papers document the premium to beauty in 
the labor market, and it would be reasonable to conjecture that the premium may be even higher 
among sex workers.
 25 In our sample of sex workers it could certainly be the case that more 
attractive escorts are more likely to display pictures of their faces and, conditional on displaying 
any face picture, display more face pictures.
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We tackle the issue of beauty directly by obtaining beauty measures for the escorts in our 
dataset.  We first discuss the issue that more attractive sex workers may display more face 
pictures, conditional on displaying any picture. We then discuss the potential selection issue that 
more attractive sex workers might be more likely to display face pictures in general. We asked a 
group of gay men to rate the beauty of our male escorts from the perspective of a potential client. 
Beauty was scored from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least attractive, and 5 being the most attractive. 
Both gay and closeted men were requested to serve as enumerators since heterosexually 
identified men comprise a non-negligible portion of the client base (Friedman 2003; Sadownick 
1996; Wright 2008; Logan 2009).  Nearly 90% of the escorts who show their face pictures in our 
data were given beauty scores; the mean beauty score is 3 and the standard deviation 1.2.
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In Panel A of Table IV we estimate the relationship between beauty and escort prices. 
Since subjective ratings of beauty and other personal characteristics may differ across 
enumerators, giving rise to spurious correlation, we include enumerator fixed effects in all 
specifications.  In column 1 we re-estimate the premium to face pictures, for the sample of men 
  
                                                 
25 See Daniel Hamermesh's website for a summary of findings from a number of studies. 
26 It is doubtful that all attractive escorts show their faces since men may not want long-lived evidence of their 
careers in commercial sex on the internet.  
27 We note the substantial baseline variation in escort beauty, even among those who show their faces.   - 24 - 
for whom we also have beauty scores.
28
  In columns 4-5 in panel A of Table IV, we explore whether returns to beauty may be non-
linear by including a dummy variable indicator for above average beauty (beauty score equals 4 
or 5) and below average beauty (beauty score equals 1 or 2). Again, neither of the beauty 
measures is statistically significant, although the point estimates show that above average beauty 
is rewarded and below average beauty is not. However, the face premium coefficient is still 1.5% 
and significant at the .01 level.  It appears that the inclusion of beauty and face pictures has no 
significant effect on the relationship between face pictures and escort prices.  This relative lack 
of a relationship between escort beauty and prices is consistent with the literature on the variety 
of beauty standards in gay and heterosexual communities.
  For example, Carpenter (2003) has 
shown differential partnership and attractiveness patterns between gay men and heterosexuals by 
measures of physical well-being such as BMI.  Also, there could be premiums in the market for 
men who would otherwise be considered unattractive if they had other attributes that were valued 
by the market, such as expertise in specific sexual conduct (Itiel 1998; Cameron, Collins, and 
Thew 1999; Friedman 2003).     
 Conditional on posting face pictures, the premium for 
each additional face picture is 1.5%, which is similar to our previous estimates.  In column 2 we 
include the measure of beauty, and find that while positively correlated with log hourly price, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant.  However, our main face picture result remains 
statistically significant at the .01 level and has a magnitude of 1.5%. Therefore, even after 
controlling for escort beauty, our main result remains consistent and statistically significant. In 
column 3, we include all the various control variables, such as race, height, weight, body type, 
eye color, etc. and the beauty coefficient, though smaller and still positive, is not statistically 
significant.  
Recall that the results in Panel A of Table IV estimate the beauty premium among men 
who show their faces. Therefore, there might be selection by beauty into posting—i.e. more 
beautiful men might be more likely to post face pictures.  Ultimately, we cannot rule out this 
explanation, but we can use the results of Table IV to roughly calculate how much beauty could 
explain the difference between men who do and do not show their face pictures.  To estimate the 
maximum of the proportion of the results that could be due to beauty, we assume that all men 
                                                 
28 Our baseline specification with escort beauty that does not include face pictures shows a marginally significant 
beauty coefficient of 0.0073 (.004).    - 25 - 
who do not post their face picture are rated a beauty that is strictly less than the lowest rated 
beauty (that men who do not show their faces have a beauty rating of zero, where the lowest 
beauty rating allowed is one) and that men who do post their faces are rated as the highest beauty 
score, the differences in the beauty premium between the two groups in Table IV (4.5%) could 
explain, at best, less than  one-quarter of the face picture premium (our lowest estimate of the 
face picture premium being 19.7%).
29
We can also address this issue indirectly by considering second order implications of our 
interpretation of the face picture premium.  We conjecture that text reviews reveal information 
about the quality of the escort, but not the escort’s beauty.  If the premium to face pictures is due 
to beauty, then the interaction of face pictures with text reviews should be positive: beauty would 
be a complement to quality as described in the text reviews.  If face pictures are a measure of 
quality, however, the interaction of face pictures and text reviews should be negative as face 
pictures are substitutes for client descriptions of quality.  This also acts as a test of our 
conceptual framework—in repeated signaling games the signal and reputation substitute for one 
another (Kaya 2009), which we conjecture is the case among these sex workers.  When we 
include the interaction of face pictures and text reviews in Panel B of Table IV, the interaction is 
negative in both instances (-0.009 [0.004] and -0.028 [0.031] for number and fraction, 
respectively).  The results do not change when we interact the number or fraction of face pictures 
with the number of positive text reviews (-0.004 [0.002], -0.009 [0.013] for number and fraction, 
respectively).  We take this as suggestive evidence that face pictures convey the same quality 
information as text reviews, and therefore are substitutes for quality measures.   
  Put another way, even the least attractive man is still 
much better off showing a picture of his face than not, as the “no picture” penalty is more than 
four times as large as the “unattractive” penalty.  This back-of-the-envelope calculation implies 
that beauty can explain, at best, a small fraction of the estimated face picture premium. 
We also estimate a regression where we control for the presence of face pictures with a 
dichotomous indicator and also estimate the value of marginal pictures.
 30
                                                 
29 We use the beauty premium estimated in column 2 of Table IV, the largest estimate of the beauty premium when 
we include the number of face pictures.   
  This is similar to the 
marginal estimates presented in Figure II.  If face pictures only conveyed beauty, then the 
marginal value of additional face pictures would be zero.  Otherwise, additional pictures would 
30 In this specification the premium to posting face pictures (the coefficient on the dichotomous indicator) is 15.3%.  
This implies that the beauty calculation we described earlier (4.5%) explains less than 30% of the face picture 
premium, even when excluding the marginal value of face pictures from the face picture premium.     - 26 - 
have value, although, as we argued earlier, that value would decrease with the number of 
pictures.  The results indicate that, on average, additional face pictures come with a 1.5% price 
premium, similar to the estimate in Table IV.  The premium we find applies to additional face 
pictures—two escorts of the same beauty would be paid differently if one supplied one face 
picture and the other supplied five.  This is more consistent with the notion that face pictures 
establish quality rather than beauty, which can be ascertained from a single picture.
31
d.  A Counterfactual—Signaling Without Informal Enforcement 
  Given the 
evidence presented above, we believe it is unlikely that the majority of the face picture premium 
is driven by beauty. 
A key to our interpretation is the belief that informal policing conducted by clients causes 
the signals that escorts send to be credible.  Without the informal enforcement, the value of the 
signal would certainly be suspect.  Additionally, informal policing would have little effect on 
beauty premiums or true quality in the market since policing would not be related to escort 
beauty itself or the claims that escorts make about the quality of their services.  Unfortunately, 
informal enforcement is difficult to test directly.  Our data does give us one unique instance 
where we can observe the value of the signal when informal enforcement is lacking.   
As noted earlier, in our online source escorts can choose whether or not they will allow 
themselves to be reviewed on the website.  Disallowing reviews is all or nothing: escorts do not 
have the option of deleting or selectively posting reviews of either type.  An escort who 
disallows reviews cannot establish a reputation in our data source.  The vast majority of escorts 
(nearly 95%) allow themselves to be reviewed.  In general the issue is moot since there is little 
variation.
32
                                                 
31 In our data we also have the physical characteristics of the escorts.  If more beautiful escorts select into providing 
face pictures and have different physical characteristics, then a comparison of the distribution of characteristics of 
escorts who do and do not show face pictures would reveal such differences.  Overall, the results show that along 
nearly every dimension of physical characteristics, the escorts who provide face pictures are statistically similar to 
those who do not.  Out of more than twenty physical characteristics (e.g., hair color, eye color, body type), there are 
only three instances where escorts who show their face pictures are significantly different from those that do not: 
escorts who show their face pictures are more likely to be blond (14% versus 10%) and have an 
“athletic/swimmer’s”  build (50% versus 42%); escorts who do not show their faces are more likely to be muscular 
(34% versus 28%). 
  The escorts in Las Vegas, however, allow themselves to be reviewed only 40% of 
the time.  Las Vegas is particularly unique—there is no other city where less than 90% of the 
escorts disallow reviews.  Of all escorts who disallow reviews, over 35% are located in Las 
Vegas.  It is doubtful that this is a state effect since escorts in other Nevada cities allow reviews 
32 In our regressions we control for whether the escort allows himself to be reviewed.   - 27 - 
more than 90% of the time.  While the exact cause of this curiosity is unknown,
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For comparison, Table V shows summary statistics for escorts based in Las Vegas and 
escorts based in five other randomly selected cities with similar numbers of escorts.  As the table 
shows, the cities are all similar in terms of rates and escort attributes such as height and weight.  
Similarly, escorts in Las Vegas post the same average number of face pictures as those in other 
cities.  In general, the Las Vegas market looks similar to the other markets shown in Table V and 
to the overall market, except for the fact that only 40% of escorts allow reviews.   
  we are able to 
test for the value of the signal in a location with little client policing. As we described earlier, 
client policing allows signaling to be credible, so without client policing, the value of the signal 
should be negligible.     
In Table V we replicate the regressions of Tables II and III for each city separately.  In 
every other city we find a large and significant premium to face pictures that matches the 
population estimates.  Both the dichotomous and continuous measures of face pictures yield 
estimates close to the overall values for each city except Las Vegas.   
While the value of signaling is reasonably stable across markets, the results for Las 
Vegas are striking.  In the Las Vegas market there is no premium to posting face pictures in an 
advertisement.  This is not merely an artifact of statistical significance, the point estimates for the 
value of face pictures in Las Vegas (-0.09 for the dichotomous measure, 0.007 for the continuous 
measure) are much lower than for every other city in Table V.  In the one location where client 
policing is stymied, the credibility of the signal is in doubt and market prices do not respond to 
the signal. Even among escorts who allow reviews in Las Vegas, the value of face pictures is not 
statistically significant.
34 This result conforms to our interpretation of the premium to face 
pictures in the market.
 35
 
  We also note that these results are inconsistent with either a beauty or 
true quality interpretation, unless one is willing to argue that escorts in Las Vegas are markedly 
less attractive than other escorts or are of uniformly different quality than escorts in other cities.  
                                                 
33 For examples of the narrative evidence that led us to consider the Las Vegas market, see the appendix.  We 
conjecture that the disproportionate number of tourists in the Las Vegas market leads escorts to place little value in 
their reputations, or they may feel uniquely prone to poor reviews due to cultural misunderstandings with clients.   
34 The coefficient on face pictures among the men who allow reviews in Las Vegas is -0.0037 (.40). 
35 It would be cavalier to suggest that these results for Las Vegas are definitive.  Since there is no other location in 
the data with this same information differences, it is not possible to distinguish this effect from a location effect.  
While there is evidence that clients are aware of the increased probability of encountering low quality escorts, it is 
unclear if the escorts in Las Vegas are aware of the low value of information in their market.   - 28 - 
VII.  Robustness  
a.  Prices 
A primary concern for our results is the quality of the price measure.  We use the prices 
quoted by escorts in their advertisements, but it could be that the actual prices differ for a number 
of reasons.  Though our qualitative evidence suggests that the prices posted are the prices paid, it 
could be that escorts are more willing to price discriminate once they are in the bedroom.  If this 
is the case, our empirical strategy will yield biased estimates of the value of the signal. 
Fortunately, we have spot prices, specific transaction prices recorded by clients from the most 
recent text reviews of escorts, which we manually inspected and which we can compare to the 
prices that escorts post in their advertisements.  Additionally, there are a small number of escorts 
who do not post their price, but have a spot price.  As these are prices actually paid by clients in 
specific appointments, we can check our results with these prices. 
We should note that spot prices are well correlated with posted prices (r = 0.89).  Even 
so, we check our results with spot prices in two ways.  First, we replace existing prices with spot 
prices where available.  These results are reported in Columns 1-3 of Table VI, which replicate 
the regressions in column 5 of Table II (1), column 5 of Table III- Panel A (2), and column 5 of 
Table III- Panel B (3).  The results with the spot prices replacing the posted prices do not alter 
the results.  As a more stringent test, we use only spot prices in columns 4-6 of Table VI.  Using 
only spot prices as our dependent variable substantially reduces the size of our sample, but we 
still find that the presence of face pictures yields a premium of more than 15%.   The premium to 
each face picture is slightly smaller and may be due to the fact that the variation in the number of 
face pictures is much smaller for men with text reviews.   
Another potential concern with our results is that they could be driven jointly by 
reputation and information.  Although we have included measures of reputation in all of our 
specifications, it could be that men supply higher quality information once their reputation is 
established, rather than the reverse. In a repeated game, for example, one can conjecture that face 
pictures are not the signal, but positive first encounters which lead to positive reputations and 
repeat clients that help clients differentiate.  If the market is dominated by clients returning to the 
same escorts with whom they have had a good first encounter, it will drive our results. 
  We test for this reverse determination by looking at escorts who have no reputation to 
speak of; they have neither survey reviews nor text reviews.  These could be new escorts in the 
market or old escorts who are abandoning an older profile.  On the one hand, escorts with no   - 29 - 
reputation are unknown and could be more likely to signal against type.  On the other hand, the 
only information a client can use to determine the quality of these escorts is the information 
conveyed in their advertisement, so the signal may be particularly valuable.  In either case, those 
with no reputation can only disclose their type through the information in their advertisement.         
In columns 7-9 of Table VI we regress price on our usual set of covariates for escorts 
with no reputation.  The results show that face pictures matter more for escorts with no 
reputation.  The premium to the presence of face pictures is over 18%.  The premium to each 
individual face picture is more than 3%, slightly higher than the premium estimated for escorts 
overall.  Therefore, it seems that when escorts do not have an established reputation, signaling 
may be even more important.    
b.  Selection 
Escorts do not have to post their prices in their advertisements, although well over 85% 
of the men in our data do. For example, an escort can list that he provides a given service (incall 
or outcall), but may not post the price for that service.  Our results could overstate the effects of 
information if there is selection into posting prices that varies with the information content of the 
advertisement, which could lead to selection in either direction.  It could be that escorts who post 
more pictures or more face pictures are more likely to post their prices since they have signaled 
their quality.  Conversely, they could be less likely to not post their prices in order to seize as 
much consumer surplus as possible from clients, and similar ideas could be given for escorts 
with few pictures or no face pictures.  These types of arguments could be extended to the 
reservation wages of escorts who do or do not provide a certain set of information to the market, 
which itself could alter the estimate of the returns to signaling quality in the market.  To test 
whether the number or type of pictures has any impact on the decision to post prices, we estimate 
a probit model where the outcome is whether the escort posts prices.  The results of these 
regressions are reported in Table VII.  We find that the number of pictures, the presence of face 
and/or body pictures, and the number of face and body pictures do not significantly predict the 
decision to post prices.  This holds when we consider a number of alternative specifications and 
when we include or exclude additional controls.  We take this as evidence that the decision to 
post prices is not influenced by the other information in the advertisement itself. 
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VIII.  Conclusion 
Male sex workers are unique in illegal markets: they price independently without 
intermediaries, use a rich information environment to solicit clients, and their large number 
creates a competitive setting where we expect markets to function.  Since formal institutional 
enforcement is non-existent, the market could be plagued with adverse selection.  However, we 
find that escorts do convey a great deal of information through their advertisements and that the 
market rewards this information.  Empirically, the reward to face pictures is substantial; it is the 
driving force behind the premium to information in this market. Not only do we find a sizable 
information premium in this market,but the magnitude is similar to the premium seen in legal 
markets.   
We note a caveat to our results.  Although it would be tempting to argue that our results 
show that informal institutions such as client-policing are close substitutes for formal institutions 
such as courts, it could well be true that the premium to information we observe is due entirely to 
the complementary effects of informal institutions.  Even in markets with formal contracts and 
enforcement, the types of forums created by the clients of male sex workers are common (e.g., 
AngiesList.com).  As we documented, client communication dramatically raises the costs of 
deception because detection is likely. A dishonest escort may swindle one or two clients, but the 
possibility of doing so frequently is unlikely.   Informal policing is critical to this market.     
The relationship between formal and informal institutions is inherently complex. We can 
say little about their interaction since formal institutions play no role here.  More empirical 
research is needed on the interaction of formal and informal institutions to estimate the degree of 
substitutability or complementarity between the two.  While our results do not address how much 
the premium to signaling would change if there was formal enforcement in this market, we 
provide novel evidence that rich information environments alone allow escorts and clients to 
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Example Escort  
Text of escort advertisement 
XX – Primary City 
 
 




 Age:   NN   Race:   XX   Body Type:   XX 
 Height:   NN   Hair Color:  XX   Body Hair:   XX 






Escort   
Erotic Massage   




Modeling   
Stripping/Dancer   




US Travel:  Yes 




Cellular:  (NNN) NNN-NNNN 
 
PREFERS PHONE CONTACT 
"PRIVATE CALLER" 
PHONE CALLS 




XX – Primary City 
 XX – City 2 
 XX – City 3 





  S M T W T  F  S 
7am-11am               
11am-3pm               
3pm-7pm               
7pm-11pm               
11pm-3am               




































Number of Face Pictures
Figure II
The Marginal Value of Face Pictures
Marginal Value 95% Confidence IntervalVariable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Price 1476 216.88 64.46 488 187.09 64.54 988 231.59 59.15
Log of Price 1476 5.34 0.29 488 5.18 0.31 988 5.41 0.25
Spot Price 1534 217.86 64.49 506 188.52 64.52 1028 232.30 59.40
Weight 1932 167.11 24.54 635 169.73 24.93 1297 165.83 24.25
Height 1932 70.43 2.69 635 70.55 2.56 1297 70.37 2.75
Age 1932 28.20 6.93 635 29.54 7.02 1297 27.54 6.79
Black 1932 0.22 0.41 635 0.24 0.43 1297 0.21 0.41
Hispanic 1932 0.14 0.35 635 0.14 0.35 1297 0.14 0.35
Multiracial 1932 0.08 0.28 635 0.09 0.28 1297 0.08 0.28
Other Race 1932 0.01 0.10 635 0.01 0.10 1297 0.01 0.10
White 1932 0.54 0.50 635 0.50 0.50 1297 0.56 0.50
Asian 1932 0.01 0.12 635 0.03 0.16 1297 0.01 0.09
Number of Pictures 1932 6.14 2.84 635 5.17 2.81 1297 6.61 2.73
Body Only Pictures 1932 2.08 2.07 635 3.16 2.39 1297 1.55 1.66
Face Pictures 1932 2.90 2.96 635 0.00 0.00 1297 4.32 2.63
Survey Reviews 1932 3.18 6.72 635 3.25 7.43 1297 3.15 6.34
Text Reviews 1932 0.35 1.03 635 0.36 1.16 1297 0.35 0.96
Fraction Good Survey 1137 0.88 0.27 357 0.86 0.31 780 0.89 0.25
Fraction Good Text 347 0.88 0.30 107 0.89 0.29 240 0.87 0.31
Notes:
Fraction Good Survey and Fraction Good Text are defined over escorts with survey or text reviews, respectively.  
Price is the outcall price posted by an escort in his advertisement.  
 If an escort has both a spot price and a posted price, or no posted price and a spot price, the spot price replaces the posted or missing price.
See the data appendix for variable definitions.
No Face Pictures Face Pictures Whole Sample
Table I
Summary Statistics for the Escort Sample(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Pictures 0.0168*** 0.0165*** 0.0156*** 0.00777*** 0.00969***
[0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0021] [0.0022]
Log of No. of Reviews 0.00352 -0.0111 -0.00943 -0.00762
[0.010] [0.010] [0.0096] [0.0098]
Log of No. of Text Reviews 0.0881*** 0.0925*** 0.0918***
[0.014] [0.012] [0.012]
Has Face Pictures? 0.195*** 0.180***
[0.046] [0.048]
Has Body Only Pictures? -0.0632***
[0.014]
Additional Controls^ X X X X X
Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.32
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Notes:
Each Column is an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the price.
^Each column includes controls for race, age, height, weight, state, top, bottom, versatile, whether 
the escort was available all day, body type, body hair, whether the escort advertised
safer sex, eye color, review allowed, and whether the escort preferred phone contact.  
See the data appendix for variable definitions. 
Table II
Information, Reputation and the Price of Male Escort ServicesPanel A: Number of Types of Pictures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Face Pictures 0.0317*** 0.0305*** 0.0293*** 0.0286*** 0.0283***
[0.0060] [0.0055] [0.0058] [0.0057] [0.0056]
No. of Body Only Pictures -0.00468 -0.00617 -0.0069 -0.00493
[0.0039] [0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0037]
Log of No. of Reviews 0.0146 -0.0037 -0.0104
[0.0089] [0.010] [0.0096]
Log of No. of Text Reviews 0.103*** 0.0913***
[0.018] [0.014]
Additional Controls^ X
Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.29
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Panel B: Composition of Pictures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of Pictures 0.0139*** 0.0140*** 0.0126*** 0.0114*** 0.00987***
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0022]
Fraction Face Pictures 0.241*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.194*** 0.216***
[0.050] [0.057] [0.058] [0.058] [0.056]
Fraction Body Only Pictures  -0.0806** -0.0821** -0.0768** -0.0318
[0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.031]
Log of No. of Reviews 0.0133 -0.00338 -0.0234**
[0.0091] [0.010] [0.0099]
Log of No. of Text Reviews 0.0961*** 0.0575***
[0.017] [0.018]
Fraction 4 Star Reviews 0.0396
[0.026]
Fraction Positive Text Reviews 0.0424
[0.030]
Additional Controls^ X
Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-squared 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.32
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Notes: Each Column is an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the price.
Each column includes controls for state.  ^Column 5 includes controls for race, age, height, weight, top, 
bottom, versatile, whether the escort was available all day, body type, body hair, if the escort advertised 
safer sex, eye color, review allowed, and whether  the escort preferred phone contact.
 See data appendix for variable definitions.
Table III
Quality of Information and the Price of Male Escort ServicesPanel A: Beauty and Face Pictures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Face Pictures 0.0149*** 0.0153*** 0.0132*** 0.0153*** 0.0131***
[0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0038] [0.0035] [0.0039]
Beauty 0.0089 0.007
[0.0063] [0.0063]
Above Average Beauty 0.0076 -0.0006
[0.0249] [0.0247]
Below Average Beauty -0.0155 -0.0195
[0.0253] [0.0251]
Additional Controls^ X X
Observations 849 849 849 849 849
R-squared 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.14
Panel B: The Interaction of Escort Reputation and Information
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Face Pictures * Text Reviews -0.00922**
[0.0035]
No. of Face Pictures * Positive Text Reviews -0.00373**
[0.0015]
Fraction Face * Text Reviews -0.0278
[0.031]
Fraction Face * Positive Text Reviews -0.0092
[0.013]
Additional Controls^ X X X X
Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.32
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Each Column is an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the log of the price.
Beauty is measured on a 1 to 5 scale with 5 being the most beautiful.  Above average beauty is a 
beauty measure greater than 3, and below average beauty is a beauty measure less than 3. 
In panel A, each colum includes fixed effects for each beauty enumerator.
In panel B, columns 1 and 2 also include the number of face pictures and number of body pictures.
In panel B, columns 3 and 4 also include the number of pictures and fraction of face and body pictures.
^Columns 3, 5 in Panel A and each column of Panel B includes controls for race, age, height, weight, 
state, top, bottom, versatile, whether the escort was available all day, body type, body hair, whether 
the escort advertised safer sex, eye color, review allowed, whether the escort preferred phone contact, 
number of survey reviews, number of text reviews, and the fraction of highly-rated survey and text 
reviews, respectively.  See the data appendix for variable definitions. 
Table IV
Is the Data Consistent with a Beauty Interpretation? Las Vegas Chicago Atlanta Houston Dallas Boston
Observations 65 78 76 65 92 54
Review Allowed? 0.40 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.95 0.96
(0.49) (0.20) (0.26) (0.12) (0.22) (0.19)
Price 227.36 231.79 232.74 209.9 207.12 232.13
(66.95) (57.20) (86.38) (57.93) (62.65) (51.74)
No. of Pictures 6.44 6.38 6.52 6.18 6.46 6.24
(2.75) (2.57) (2.82) (2.69) (2.77) (2.97)
No. of Face Pictures 2.80 2.73 3.43 2.41 2.15 2.79
(2.81) (2.77) (3.04) (3.09) (2.52) (3.42)
Age 28.75 27.48 27.33 26.35 29.31 26.7
(6.97) (6.02) (6.19) (6.29) (6.91) (5.88)
Height 70.88 70.62 70.56 70.06 70.44 69.76
(2.70) (2.95) (2.59) (2.49) (2.67) (2.80)
Weight 172.23 166.59 166.46 168.02 169.41 165.43
(25.02) (30.16) (21.77) (23.48) (24.47) (31.31)
Las Vegas Chicago Atlanta Houston Dallas Boston
Has Face Pictures? -0.086 0.257*** 0.221** 0.350*** 0.347*** 0.253**
[0.097] [0.056] [0.090] [0.080] [0.049] [0.093]
Has Body Pictures? -0.141 -0.114* -0.0706 -0.0834 -0.0407 -0.0314
[0.092] [0.060] [0.097] [0.093] [0.069] [0.091]
R-squared 0.4 0.39 0.16 0.53 0.6 0.35
Las Vegas Chicago Atlanta Houston Dallas Boston
No. of Face Pictures 0.00742 0.0300*** 0.0285* 0.0355** 0.0449*** 0.0279*
[0.017] [0.011] [0.016] [0.015] [0.011] [0.014]
No. of Body Only Pictures 0.00208 0.00228 -0.0262 -0.0105 -0.00726 0.00243
[0.024] [0.015] [0.022] [0.021] [0.013] [0.021]
R-squared 0.33 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.48 0.22
Standard deviations in parentheses. Robust standard errors in brackets (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
Panels B and C include the following additional variables in the regressions: number of survey reviews,
number of text reviews, fraction of survey and text reviews that are positive, age, height, weight,  
and race.  Panel B includes the total number of pictures.  See data appendix for variable definitions.
Table V
Enforcement Proxy and the Value of the Signal
Panel A: Summary Statistics by City
Panel B: Estimates of the Value of Any Face or Body Pictures in Escort Advertisements
Panel C: Estimates of the Value of Face and Body Pictures in Escort Advertisements(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Number of Pictures 0.00901*** 0.00970*** 0.00724 0.00976 0.00695 0.00927*
[0.0023] [0.0021] [0.0079] [0.0076] [0.0047] [0.0046]
Has Face Pictures? 0.177*** 0.168*** 0.188***
[0.048] [0.061] [0.059]
Has Body Only Pictures? -0.0587*** -0.0293 -0.0431**
[0.014] [0.035] [0.020]
No. of Face Pictures 0.0266*** 0.0142* 0.0318***
[0.0054] [0.0074] [0.0084]
No. of Body Only Pictures -0.00469 -0.0041 -0.00995
[0.0038] [0.013] [0.0078]
Fraction Face Pictures 0.213*** 0.089 0.234***
[0.056] [0.064] [0.084]
Fraction Body Only Pictures -0.0272 -0.11 -0.0158
[0.032] [0.092] [0.053]
Log of No. of Reviews -0.00909 -0.0115 -0.0099 -0.0405 -0.0333 -0.0358
[0.0100] [0.0098] [0.0098] [0.025] [0.031] [0.031]
Log of No. of Text Reviews 0.0941*** 0.0934*** 0.0917*** 0.0811** 0.0662 0.0614
[0.013] [0.017] [0.016] [0.032] [0.042] [0.039]
Additional Controls^ X X X X X X X X X
Observations 1533 1533 1533 243 243 243 610 610 610
R-squared 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.51 0.46 0.48 0.32 0.3 0.32
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Notes: Each column is an OLS regression.  In columns 1-3 is the log of the spot price.  If an escort has both a spot price and a posted price, or no
posted price and a spot price, the spot price replaces the posted or missing price.   Dependent xariable in Columns 4-6 is the log of the spot 
price only. Dependent variable in Columns 7-9 is the log of the price (for escorts with no reviews only). ^Each column includes controls for race,
age, height, weight, state, top, bottom, versatile, whether the escort was available all day, body type, body hair, whether the escort advertised 
safer sex, eye color, review allowed, and whether  the escort preferred phone contact. See data appendix for variable definitions. 
Spot Prices Only
Table VI
Robustness Checks for Information Quality and the Price of Male Escort Services
Spot Prices Escorts with No Reputation(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of Pictures 0.00245 0.0024 0.00286 0.00304
[0.0036] [0.0034] [0.0031] [0.0031]
Has Face Pictures? 0.00112 -0.00181 0.00007
[0.017] [0.018] [0.019]
Has Body Only Pictures? -0.012 -0.0154
[0.022] [0.021]
No. of Face Pictures 0.00448 0.0058 0.00634
[0.0030] [0.0038] [0.0040]
No. of Body Only Pictures 0.00473 0.00372
[0.0054] [0.0054]
Additional Controls^ X X
Observations 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932 1932
Pseudo R-squared 0.0517 0.0517 0.052 0.055 0.0528 0.0535 0.0566
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1)
Notes:
Each column reports results of a probit regression where the dependent variable is: Does Escort Post Prices? 
(Mean of dependent variable = 0.85, Standard Error of dependent variable =0.36)
The coefficients reported are the marginal effects of the probit regressions.  For continuous variables  
(such as "Number of Pictures") the effect is evaluated at the mean.  For dichotomous variables (such "Has
Face Pictures?") the effects calculate the change in probability from moving from 0 to 1.  
Each column includes controls for state.  ^Columns 4 and 7 include controls for race, age, height, weight, 
top, bottom, versatile, whether the escort was available all day, body type, body hair, review allowed, 
whether the escort advertised safer sex, eye color, and whether the escort preferred phone contact.  
See data appendix for variable definitions. 
Table VII
Information and Selection into Posting Escort PricesAppendix 1:  Further Results 
Appendix Table I replicates the results in our paper using the “incall” price, where a client goes to the 
escort.  While one may be concerned that the incall results could be different because of the different type 
of call (and the fact that the escort must give a client his specific location in order to host an incall), all of 
the results are robust to the difference in price type.  Appendix Table II presents results for a logarithmic 
specification, where the log of pictures is used as the explanatory variable rather than the level.  Appendix 
Table III shows the specification where the third category of pictures (non-nude, non-face pictures) are 
included in the specification. This category of picture cannot be included in the specifications in Table II 
or Table III due to colinearity, but their inclusion into specifications such as those in the top panel of 
Table III increase the size of the effect of face pictures on escort prices.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Data Appendix 
Our data is the universe of men advertising on our site in the United States at the time of data collection.  
Our data is the entire population of escorts—we collected the data by searching through every geographic 
listing in the US during the period of data collection (January 2008 to May 2008).  Each escort has a page 
specific to him that we used to gather the information.  The website generates it income from escorts only, 
clients do not pay to access any ads and no portion of the site is restricted from the public.  By agreement, 
the url of the website and its parent company are not listed.   
 
There are other websites available for clients of male sex workers.  In Appendix Table IV we compare the 
number of escorts on our chosen site to those on its two most prominent competitors.  For each city we 
list, we also include the Gay Concentration Index developed by Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2007), which 
shows the concentration of gay households in the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) over the national 
average.  This is done so that readers can gauge the depth of the website by some measure of gay location 
patterns, which can differ from those of heterosexuals (Black, et al. 2002). 
 
In Panel A of Appendix Table IV we show total numbers of escorts from a sample of large cities.  As the 
panel indicates, our online source contains more advertisements than either competitor in all cities. This is 
true even though the other sites allow for double counting: escorts can list themselves in multiple cities, 
inflating the numbers of escorts in each city.  Focusing on the largest cities may obscure important 
heterogeneity across regions, so we also look at the geographic dispersion beyond the largest cities.  Panel 
B shows escort numbers from a random sample of smaller cities.  Here we count only the escorts in our 
source by their home base, while we count the total number of escorts for the other sites regardless of 
their home base. This implies we upwardly bias the number of escorts by city for the two competitors.  
Even using this method, our website’s coverage of the male escort market is greater than that of the two 
competitors, and this holds for cities with high and low gay concentrations.  The last two columns of 
Panel B show the number of escorts on our site who we could locate on Competitor 1, the most prominent 
competitor, and vice versa.
1  While the majority of the escorts who advertise on competitor sites could 
also be located on our site, only a small fraction of the escorts in our source could be identified on the 
competitor’s site.  
 
We are able to identify each escort uniquely using the following information (See Figure I for a diagram 
of an escort advertisement): 
 
User ID: Each escort account on the site has a unique user ID.  This allowed us to check against the 
possibility of double counting escorts who may change location over the data collection period. 
User Name: Each escort has a username that is displayed next to the ID number at the top of the ad.  
                                                 
1 As of March 15, 2009, Competitor 1 had 1,413 unique escorts in the US, and Competitor 2 had less than 1,000, 
while we have more than 1,900 in our data.   The measures we use in the paper are described below: 
Services Provided: Under this heading each escort has the option of noting the following services, which 
we recorded 
  Incall: Escort responds “yes” or “no”  
  Outcall: Escort responds “yes” or “no” 
  Incall Price: The price (by the hour) that incall services are provided at if incalls provided 
  Outcall Price: The price (by the hour) that outcall services are provided at if outcalls provided   
Contact Information: Under this heading each escort has the option of noting the following 
  Phone: Phone number with area code (we record if a number is listed y/n) 
  Cellular: Cellular number with area code (we record if a number is listed y/n) 
  Pager: Pager number with area code (we record if a number is listed y/n) 
  Prefers Phone Contact: Listed if escort prefers for clients to contact him by phone (y/n) 
  Prefers E-mail Contact: Listed if escort prefers for clients to contact him by phone (y/n) 
Location: The location listed under the heading is the primary location, the locations with suitcase avatars 
next to them are cities the escort is willing to travel to.  In some instances, exact dates are listed under 
specific travel cities, and this means that an escort is traveling to that city on those dates and will serve 
clients in those cities on those dates.  We record all of these locations. 
Availability:  This box records an escort’s weekly availability in a matrix of 6 four hour blocks.  Since the 
majority of escorts (78.0%) check every box (indicating that they are available at any time) we record 
whether or not the entire matrix is filled in as a measure of labor supply (y/n). 
 
Age: Age is recorded in years 
Height: Height is reported in feet and inches, we record height in inches 
Weight: Weight is listed in 20 pound intervals beginning at 130 pounds and ending at 200 pounds (e.g. 
150-170 pounds).  We took the midpoint of the range given by an escort. If the escort’s text ad listed a 
weight we recorded that exact weight in place of the midpoint range. 
Race: White, Black/African-American, Asian, Hispanic, Multiracial, or Other 
Hair Color: Black, Blonde, Brown, Grey, and Red 
Eye Color:  Black, Blue, Brown, Green, Hazel 
Body Type: Athletic/Swimmer’s Build, Average, A few extra pounds, muscular/buff, thin/lean 
Body Hair:  Hairy, Moderately hairy, Shaved, Smooth 
 
For the text of escort ads we record the mention of the following (Note: since the ads were read as 
opposed to scripts we do not record the instance of the word but its meaning, which can be implied from 
the context) 
  Top: The escort stated that they are a top (the penetrative partner in anal sex) 
  Bottom: The escort stated that they are a bottom (the receptive partner in anal sex) 
  Versatile: The escort indicated that they are versatile (both top and bottom) 
No Attitude: The escort noted that they have “no attitude”/are willing to see clients without 
regard to race, body type, physical appearance, disability, etc. 
Safe:  The escort noted that he is disease drug free/ only participates in safer sex 
 
Note: In American gay society, men may not only be tops, bottoms, or versatile, but also “versatile tops” 
and “versatile bottoms.”  The meaning of such terms is the distinction between one man who would 
rarely/never partake in an activity (a “top” would never perform as a “bottom” and vice versa), and a man 
who occasionally partakes in an activity (a “versatile top” would occasionally bottom and vice versa).  
These terms are well established in gay society (Sadowick 1996).   
 
Pictures:  We recorded the number of unique pictures in each ad (e.g., the same picture used twice in an 
ad was only recorded in the first instance).  The maximum number of pictures allowed per advertisement 
is 12.  Each picture in an advertisement is a thumbnail that may be enlarged by selecting the picture.  Each picture was individually inspected.  Pictures that contained blurry and unrecognizable faces are 
noted as pictures but not noted as a type of picture, and are therefore included in the omitted category in 
the regressions.  The number of pictures in the following categories were recorded. 
  Number of Pictures: The total number of unique pictures in an escort’s ad 
Face Pictures: Pictures that show an escort’s face only and pictures that show an escort’s face 
as well as other body parts (nude or non-nude).   
Body Only Pictures: Pictures that do not show an escort’s face but do display the frontal genital 
area, the buttocks, or a combination thereof.   
 
Review Allowed: If an escort has disabled the option to be reviewed we note it.  Note that disabling 
reviews does not delete existing reviews of the escort, and only applies to survey reviews.  Well over 90% 
(93.9%) of escorts allowed themselves to be reviewed. 
Reviews: Reviews of both types (text and survey) can only be posted by registered member of the site.  
As registration is free, it is possible for anyone to post a review of an escort, and we do not view the 
registration requirement as a hindrance for posting a review.    We record the following from the reviews 
  Number of Reviews: The total number of survey reviews 
  Number of Four-Star Reviews: The number of four-star reviews recorded for that escort 
  Text Reviews: The total number of text reviews for an escort 
Hire Again: The number of text reviews in which the reviewer indicated that they would hire 
the escort again.  
Spot Prices: For the most recent text review, we record the price and the price type (e.g., incall 
or outcall). If the appointment is a weekend or evening price we record it as weekend or 
evening prices and do not use these extended appointment prices as spot prices in our paper.   
 
 
Appendix 3: Narrative Evidence Regarding the Las Vegas Escort Market 
We provide examples of the narrative evidence that led us to consider the Las Vegas market below.  
 
Keep in mind that Vegas has a long history of crappy escorts, especially who claim to be jocks. 
 
Be cautious with pros in Vegas, because of the massive tourism turnover they can make fairly 
good money without being any good (it’s not like they need repeat business). Old/wrong photos 
are your first hint to call it off. So is a request for money up front, as always.  
 
Vegas is a crapshoot (!) The guys there are scammers. They make their money off the strip 
tourists, so they don’t worry about providing good service.   
 
Our conjecture is that the Las Vegas market is unique due to its almost exclusive dependence on tourist 
clients, whereas other cities have large numbers of resident clients in addition to travelers.  The 
dependence on tourist clients does not explain why or how Las Vegas escorts choose to disallow reviews 
of themselves on the escort website.  One argument is that lack of repeat business would lead one not to 
care about reputation, but it is still the case that a good reputation would help to attract new clients.  It 
could also be the case that the increased probability of serving foreign clients creates a disproportionate 
number of negative reviews due to cultural misunderstandings.  Policing differences in Las Vegas are 
another possibility.  Given the lack of hard evidence consistent with any of these explanations we resist 
the temptation to attach any one explanation to this market, other than exploiting the dearth of client 
reviews as we do in the text. 
 Panel A: Number of Types of Pictures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No. of Face Pictures 0.0255*** 0.0242*** 0.0217*** 0.0207*** 0.0206***
[0.0045] [0.0044] [0.0043] [0.0041] [0.0037]
No. of Body Only Pictures ‐0.00487 ‐0.00803 ‐0.00917* ‐0.0073
[0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0051] [0.0048]





Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125
R‐squared 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.21 0.27
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Composition of Pictures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Appendix Table I
Quality of Information and the Price of Male Escort Services (Incall Prices)
Number of Pictures 0.0117*** 0.0118*** 0.00857** 0.00709** 0.00531
[0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0035] [0.0033]
Fraction Face Pictures 0.195*** 0.158*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.179***
[0.037] [0.042] [0.044] [0.044] [0.048]
Fraction Body Only Pictures ‐0.0582 ‐0.0622 ‐0.0608 ‐0.0192
[0.042] [0.043] [0.042] [0.048]









Observations 1125 1125 1125 1125 1125






(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log of No. of Face Pictures 0.125*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.116*** 0.114***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025]
Log of No. of Body Only Pictures ‐0.0112 ‐0.016 ‐0.017 ‐0.0124
[0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.011]





Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
R‐squared 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.31
Robust standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel B: Composition of Pictures 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Appendix Table II
Logarithmic Specification for Quality of Information and the Price of  Male Escort Services
Log of No. of Pictures 0.0889*** 0.0901*** 0.0818*** 0.0752*** 0.0603***
[0.015] [0.015] [0.017] [0.018] [0.016]
Fraction Face Pictures 0.241*** 0.189*** 0.189*** 0.192*** 0.216***
[0.050] [0.057] [0.058] [0.057] [0.056]
Fraction Body Only Pictures ‐0.0823** ‐0.0837** ‐0.0783** ‐0.0333
[0.034] [0.035] [0.033] [0.031]









Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475





if the escort advertised safer sex, eye color, and whether  the escort preferred phone contact. (1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Face Pictures 0.0295*** 0.0303*** 0.0288*** 0.111***





No. of Body Only Pictures ‐0.0041 ‐0.00382 ‐0.00522 ‐0.0258*



















Observations 1475 1475 1475 1475







City Rank Index Our Data Comp 1 Comp 2
San Francisco, CA 1 4.95 316 75 78
Washington, DC 2 2.68 275 72 29
Los Angeles, CA 6 2.11 535 194 119
Atlanta, GA 7 1.96 290 45 68
Boston, MA 9 1.67 110 68 35
New York City, NY 13 1.49 645 376 173
Miami, FL 14 1.46 321 80 60
Chicago, IL 18 1.31 241 56 59
Panel B: Sample of Smaller Cities
Our Data / Comp 1  /
City Rank Index Our Data Comp 1 Comp 2 Comp 1 Our Data
Austin, TX 3 2.44 26 3 15 2 / 32  / 26
Seattle, WA 5 2.21 33 14 23 11 / 14 11 / 33
Sacramento, CA 8 1.71 17 7 5 5 / 75  / 17





Denver, CO 12 1.53 41 5 19 5 / 55  / 41
Portland, OR 15 1.45 15 1 12 1 / 11  / 15
Indianapolis, IN 19 1.12 19 0 5 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Tampa, FL 24 1.05 47 15 22 11 / 15 11 / 47
Kansas City, MO 25 1.04 9 1 7 0 / 10  / 9
Columbus, OH 27 0.99 30 3 13 3 / 33  / 30
Rochester, NY 29 0.89 4 0 0 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Albany, NY 31 0.85 5 0 3 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Nashville, TN 32 0.85 14 1 8 1 / 11  / 14
Oklahoma City, OK 34 0.83 3 1 0 1 / 11  / 3
St. Louis, MO 37 0.69 18 3 6 2 / 32  / 18
Detroit, MI 42 0.6 73 10 14 9 / 10 9 / 73
Charlotte, NC 45 0.49 19 3 4 2 / 32  / 19
Buffalo, NY 49 0.35 5 0 0 ‐‐‐ ‐‐‐
Total 411 69 171 55 / 69 55 / 378
Notes:  Comp 1 = Competitor 1, Comp 2 = Competitor 2.  
Accessed on 1/25/09.  Counts of number of unique escort advertisements (Panel A).   Counts of 
number of escorts by home base for our data (Panel B). Gay concentration  is the fraction of the MSA 
identified as same‐sex male partners in the 1990 Census divided by the national average.  See Black, 
Sanders, and Taylor (2007) for futher details. The last two columns in Panel B show the number of escorts 
listed in our data source who could be identified on Competitor 1 and the number of escorts listed
on Competitor 1 who could be identified in our data source, respectively.  Cities in the bottom panel were 
selected at random from the fifty cities listed in Black, Sanders, and Taylor (2007).